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Abstract
Given growing investment capital in research and development, accompanied by extensive
literature on the subject by researchers in nearly every domain from civil engineering to legal
studies, automated decision-support systems (ADM) are likely to see a place in the foreseeable
future. Artificial intelligence (AI), as an automated system, can be defined as broad range of
computerized tasks designed to replicate human neural networks, store and organize large
quantities of information, detect patterns, and make predictions with increasing accuracy and
reliability. By itself, artificial intelligence is not quite science-fiction tropes (i.e. an
uncontrollable existential threat to humanity) yet not without real-world implications. The fears
that come from machines operating autonomously are justified in many ways given their ability
to worsen existing inequalities, collapse financial markets (the 2010 “flash crash”), erode trust in
societal institutions, and pose threats to physical safety. Still, even when applied in complex
social environments, the political and legal mechanisms for dealing with the risks and harms that
are likely to arise from artificial intelligence are not obsolete. As this paper seeks to demonstrate,
other Information Age technologies have introduced comparable issues. However, the dominant
market-based approach to regulation is insufficient in dealing with issues related to artificial
intelligence because of the unique risks they pose to civil liberties and human rights. Assuming
the government has a role in protecting values and ensuring societal well-being, in this paper, I
work toward an alternative regulatory approach that focuses on regulating the commercial side of
automated decision-making and machine learning techniques.
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I.

Introduction

For all its promises, artificial intelligence has a major issue: algorithmic bias. In 1997,
Amazon’s hiring engine was found to penalize words such as ‘women’s chess club captain’ and
downgraded applicants who indicated they attended all women’s colleges (Dastin, 2018).
Though the algorithm was subsequently abandoned, there is nothing that bars companies from
employing similar applicant-tracking systems in the future. Similarly, a ProPublica investigation
of “risk assessment” scores used by judges to predict recidivism rates among offenders, using
social determinants such as race and class, found that the algorithm was prejudiced against Black
people (Angwin, Larson, Kirchner, and Mattu, 2016). In each instance, automated decisionmaking and machine learning techniques assisted in the decision-making process. Each system
was given a massive amount of data to quickly sift through, sort, and recognize patterns that
would be otherwise unrecognizable by a human. Still, the emerging pattern shows that something
went gravely wrong. Identifying whether it was human error during the data “cleaning” process,
an unrepresentative dataset, or the implicit biases of the software developer reflected in the
algorithm, getting to the root of the issue proves particularly challenging given artificial
intelligence, as a machine learning system, involves a process that is not well-understood even
by technical experts.
Since the late 1950s, concurrent to the rise of other ‘Information Age’ technologies, research
and development in artificial networks has seen many ‘winters’ and ‘springs.’ Beginning in the
early 1970s, the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) of the United States’ Department
of Defense awarded contracts to develop a system of distributed networks that shared data in
real-time. The project, spearheaded by Eisenhower in response to the Soviet launching of
Sputnik, became what is known today as the internet (Gabriel, 2020). The Telecommunications
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Act of 1996, subsequently passed by the Clinton Administration, revolutionized communication
networks by increasing competition in the broadband market, making the internet cheaper and
more widely accessible to users across the nation (Ehrlich, 2014). Today, internet users have the
advantage of a global network enabling them to be in multiple ‘places’ at once. However, not
unlike most disruptive technologies, several legal and ethical concerns were raised. For example,
how does a nation prosecute a crime that happened across borders? In 1994, several hackers,
located in multiple continents, hacked into the cash management system of a major U.S. bank
funneling $10 million in their personal bank accounts (“A Byte Out of History, $10 Million
Hack”, 2014). Issues such as these raised basic questions related to jurisdiction and governance
prompting a panoply of scholarship by legal academics during the 1990s. Alongside jurisdiction
and governance, a host of other challenges were also raised related to concepts such as privacy,
security, and intellectual property. The result were laws on copyright infringement, privacy, and
hate speech (“Development of the Internet and the World Wide Web,” 1999).
Comparable to the rise of the Internet, artificial intelligence was spearheaded by governmentsponsored defense programs and privately-funded research projects at large universities and
companies (“Development of the Internet and the World Wide Web,” 1999). Research into
artificial intelligence began in the 1960s but it was not until the 21st century, when required
processing power and availability of datasets and labor became available that investment in
artificial intelligence as a serious commercial interest boomed. Total global capital investment in
artificial intelligence is estimated to be $69.6 billion and growing (Zhang et al., 2021).
Advancements in automated decision-making, machine learning, and predictive analysis have
streamlined the way industries and various institutions conduct their internal operations and
public affairs, further embedding technology into the minds of technologists, researchers,
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politicians, scientists, and the public. More and more, businesses are realizing the supply-side
advantages of automated decision making, saving both time and money as daily operational
efficiency improves. For example, mortgage lenders use decision-support systems to approve
prequalified customers for loans in a matter of minutes (Townson, 2020). Still, the scales by
which predictive analysis and machine learning are utilized in everyday operations is
contextually dependent on the goals of an organization, availability of necessary infrastructure,
data and algorithms, and the pace of technological development (Feldstein, 2019).
Admittedly, this is an extremely simplified version of the decades between the initial
founding of the Internet to the development of highly sophisticated machines such as IBM’s
DeepBlue that defeated the reigning world chess champion in 1997. Like the end of the 1990s
and early 2000s, which was marked by concern over individual privacy rights spurred by the
internet, present day concerns center around the regulation of automated decision-making and
machine learning. Many civil society groups, politicians, government, technologists, and
researchers, expressing concern over threats to democracy, have called for regulation of
technologies that have greater agency in a world increasingly governed by algorithms. Even
famed technologist Elon Musk said so at MIT’s 2014 AeroAstro Centennial Symposium: “I am
increasingly inclined to think that there should be some regulatory oversight, maybe at the
national and international level, just to make sure that we don’t do something very foolish.”
Other prominent public figures, Bill Gates and Stephen Hawking, have made strikingly similar
statements. This is due to the unprecedented challenges of automated decision-making and its
attendant threat to civil liberties and humans rights.
Automated decision-making and machine learning algorithms have an ability to result in
unfair bias if preventative measures are not taken such that a statistical overgeneralization is
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made, training datasets are unrepresentative of a subset of the population, the implicit biases of
the software developer are reflected in the dataset, the operator is susceptible to ‘automation’
bias, or even a simple error is made during the data input process (Luciano, et al., 2016). While
discrimination in every circumstance is not necessarily ‘bad,’ the black box issue of machine
learning makes it nearly impossible to know who to hold accountable when a claim of unfair
discrimination does arise. This is because automated decision-making systems are diffuse. That
is, the lines of accountability are increasingly blurred when it becomes difficult to identify
whether it was the software developer who did not train the machine on characteristically diverse
datasets, the judge placing an inordinate amount of faith in the decisional output, the failure of a
state agency to use sound data collection methods, or any combination of the three.
In response to these issues, several researchers (see Black and Murray, 2019) claim machine
learning can be juxtaposed within existing Information Age regulatory frameworks, especially
those concerning the internet. However, while there is considerable overlap, the underlying
concerns guiding internet regulation differ in significant ways from those of the present day in
regards to automated decision making. Indeed, the commercialization of the internet created the
conditions by which these systems began to flourish. For example, the internet introduced
efficiency and rapidity into how we communicate while also cheaply commoditizing personal
information, laying the foundation for the development of machine learning. However, the
shared principles, norms, and rules that shaped responses (or lack thereof) of internet regulation
do not provide the framework needed to respond to the unique challenges of artificial
intelligence. This is because the government’s regulatory strategy, in its approach to ADM,
implicitly operates under the same neoliberalist principles that prioritizes innovation in ADM
putting principles of transparency, accountability, fairness, and justice at risk.
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This paper primarily focuses on the problems associated with unsupervised learning which
refers to the ability of machines to quickly sort through and analyze massive amounts of data to
find previously unknown patterns in behavior. Emerging patterns from these systems can be used
to derive ‘actionable insights,’ perhaps the most valued form of data to an organization. To help
elucidate ADM’s unique issues and situate them within a social science, I will offer an
epistemological explanation of artificial intelligence and its subcomponents, automated decisionmaking and machine learning. A brief overview of the technical process through which issues
related to unfair outcomes arise will help readers better understand where biases might become
embedded, and how developing specific checks or rules along the way could help prevent
discriminatory outcomes. In doing so, I hope to move away from the traditional approach that
has mainly focused on developing a set of ethical guidelines, or ‘soft’ laws, that guide automated
decision-making and toward a different regulatory approach. I will argue as to why there are
several issues with the how the government has approached problems with similar technologies
such as the Internet and that ADM with its own unique set of challenges, cannot be regulated in
the same manner.

II.

Artificial intelligence: Automated decision-making and machine learning

Automated decision-making, machine learning, and predictive analysis are often used
interchangeably in referring to a range of computerized tasks. Still, each differs in their
operational function. This paper is primarily concerned with machine learning as a highly
technical system, capable of performing a broad range of computerized tasks designed to
replicate human neural networks, store and organize large quantities of information, detect
patterns, and make predictions with increasing accuracy and reliability. A machine learning
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algorithm commands a machine to perform a specific set of mathematically complex functions to
generate a specified outcome (outputs) given a variety of factors (inputs). The inputs that a
machine uses to derive insights refers to data that a business, government agency, or another
entity collected either by purchasing it directly from a third-party vendor or entering into a
contractual agreement with the user. This type of data can include names, ethnicity, race, and
other fixed characteristics. A second criterion of data arguably generates the most controversy
due to the method used for its collection and how it is used. Companies will embed cookies into
web browsers and track users across webpages collecting data on the number of clicks or the
time a user spends on a webpage. In addition to these two types of data, companies are known to
collect geographical location data based on users’ IP addresses. The private sector’s ability to
freely collect, use, and even disseminate users’ personal information has arguably been the
central focus of the discussion over stricter regulation of the internet. I would now like to raise
how automated decision-making further complicates this matter and why developing standards
for ADM could help deal with shared concerns over these novel systems.
A machine learning algorithm, trained upon a sufficiently large dataset, will build upon
previous knowledge by interpolating data and generating novel patterns and insights that would
otherwise be unidentifiable by a human (Van Otterlo, 2013). Individualized profiles, either based
on factual data–as well as digitally created profiles, or inferred data–are constructed, inferences,
made, and users are targeted with advertisements based on what they are likely to be interested
in. However, uses of machine learning algorithms often go beyond advertising. Perhaps the most
valued form of data, what are called “actionable insights,” can be generated whether they be for a
CFO projecting future sales or a doctor evaluating the different outcomes for medical treatment
decisions (IBM, 2018). These insights, or predictions, that the machine produced can either
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augment or entirely replace humans in the decision-making process. For example, operating an
aircraft today is largely dependent on knowing how to operate automated flight control systems
(Schaper, 2019). Data is generated using negative feedback loops that tell the system if the plane
is flying too high or low helping the pilot make adjustments as needed.
This becomes problematic when the data that algorithms depend on are flawed because the
algorithm has the ability to reconceptualize and reontologize the world in ways that may be
undesirable (Luciano, et al., 2016). Still, even more disconcerting is that machine learning
algorithms create a black box. As algorithmic models increase in mathematical complexity,
difficulties in conceptualizing the logic of how a machine reached a certain conclusion arise. The
machine, given a new set of data, can generate an algorithm that will autonomously define its
own operational parameters, or engage in what is called ‘unsupervised learning’ (Luciano, et al.,
2016). The machine generates a classification model for determining how new inputs will be
grouped to enable it to make generalizations that go beyond the training data. The matter is
complicated by the fact that it is assumed that the operator does not need to understand the
rationale behind the development of decision-making rules (Matthias, 2004: 179). The machine
is capable of generating algorithms that are sometimes hundreds or even thousands of lines long
making it nearly impossible for computer engineers to understand. Even though there is
sufficiently large gap between the design and operation of algorithms in complex machine
learning techniques, the problem mainly lies with unrepresentative, outdated, or incomplete data,
statistical generalizations, and automation bias. (Luciano, et al., 2016).
Research by Hildebrandt (2013) into machine learning methods where humans assisted in
decision-making, found that statistical inferences, or generalizations, based on group
characteristics and large datasets has had sufficient use in the application of machine learning
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outputs. Spurious correlations in proprietary algorithms where the data indicates causation even
where the real-world circumstances might indicate otherwise has, in some instances, been
enough to act upon the evidence produced by the algorithm (Luciano et al., 2016). This could be
indicative of several issues: inadequate training for the operator on the technicalities of these
systems such that they can perpetuate or worsen inequalities such that a machine that is trained
on an insufficient number of characteristics will have a difficult time recognizing data that
deviates from the dataset it was initially trained on. For example, if Black people are more likely
to be arrested for a crime because of historical prejudices and racist policing practices this is
likely to be reflected in the machine’s output (Angwin, et al., 2016). In this instance, the machine
would infer that Black people would be more likely to commit a future crime and it is at the
discretion of the operator to determine whether the decision is applicable to the person in
question.
If the algorithm is not trained on datasets that are representative of the population this could
also be a direct result of the software developer incorporating either intentional or unintentional
biases into the dataset. For instance, if a Hispanic male software developer only sees the value in
training the algorithm on datasets that are representative of the Hispanic population or males then
that becomes problematic when the algorithm is used to make decisions regarding Asian women.
However, even improper data collection could lead to an error in the data input process if the
analyst responsible for ‘cleaning’ the data makes a simple error. These are examples meant to
demonstrate that algorithmic decision-making is fallible to human error at nearly every stage and
that a regulatory body composed of experts to monitor the use of machine learning models are
imperative to act ex ante and prevent abuses before they arise.
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III.

Normative concerns and current policy issues

Technology has an integral role in organizing societies, and, like most things revolutionizing
production processes, there are likely to be widespread concomitant societal implications. Aside
from those wrought by the internet, the turn of the century was marked by a cascade of literature
on issues created by automated decision-making. In The ethics of algorithms: Mapping the
debate, a useful taxonomy was developed to help identify three normative concerns that arise
due to the technical shortcomings of ADM: traceability, unfair outcomes, and transformative
effects (Luciano, et al., 2016). In their research, the authors concluded that there is significant
consensus concerning automated decision-making as a socio-technical system. That is, the
values, ethics, and moral concerns that (though oft disagreed upon) provide the context under
which these systems technically operate implicate normative and epistemic questions about their
ability to aid in achieving societal goals (Luciano, et al., 2016). Realizing the unique challenges
that automated decision-making raises, efforts to develop a set of soft laws from normative
concerns such as these have matured in recent years, but the literature does not offer much
beyond that. Given that bias in automated decision-making has been major point of discussion
amongst civil society groups, researchers, regulators, and even technologists, suggesting that
there is considerable interest in greater regulatory oversight, an approach that focuses more
heavily on applied, data-driven techniques and that does not simply deal in abstraction is
necessary in working toward a more salient regulatory framework.
This is not meant to discount concerted efforts made by researchers to translate the technical
shortcomings of ADM to broader philosophical precepts; a philosophy is entirely necessary to
developing a regulatory framework that transitions away from how the Internet Age technologies
have been regulated to a new set of guidelines tailored to the specific challenges of ADM. I am
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simply making a broad assertion in saying that many published works (not to the exclusion of
legal scholarship) stress the importance that ADM systems are not infallible to human error and,
as indicated by Luciano, et. al’s research, themes and patterns within the literature are entirely
cognoscible. Therefore, greater strides toward a regulatory agenda that builds on this qualitative
research should be the next natural progression in the regulatory agenda. This is also not to say
the conversation surrounding ADM should cease altogether, but occur simultaneously to greater
discussions aiming toward the realization of a set of actionable governmental goals and
objectives and the mechanisms available in helping to realize those goals. However, before
discussing possible regulatory approaches the government might take to regulate greater use of
ADM, I must first discuss problems with the current literature.
More and more, automated decision-making has raised specific concerns not only related to
criminal justice but a variety of cross-sector issues such as antitrust and fair business practices,
physical safety, personal and societal relationships, economic and social inequality, and more
(Edwards and Veale, 2017). Upon recognizing the need for more stringent guidelines, several
proposals have been made that situate automated decision-making within broader regulatory
frameworks for the internet. However, there are several reasons why the current approach to
regulation is insufficient in dealing with the unique issues that automated decision-making
systems raise. One, the internet is regulated using a principles-based approach that prescribes
principles or guidelines while leaving implementation to individual firms. Principles-based rules
introduce ambiguity and subjectivity into the moral or ethical values and are typically used to
define behavioral objectives. Typically, principles-based approaches require that ‘regulatees’
assume greater responsibility (Decker, 2018). For example, Facebook’s “Supreme Court,” an
innovation of CEO Mark Zuckerberg, is a way for users to appeal decisions concerning the ban

13

of hateful speech on the company’s platform (Kang, 2021). This might be unproblematic if the
companies that largely develop and control these systems were not currently facing numerous
allegations of human rights violations (Google has previously come under fire for its
mishandling of sexual harassment claims and for its firing of four employees that were active in
labor organizing [Conger and Wakabayaski, 2019]). Moreover, companies could report
compliance with standards and guidelines while not actually following them. In other words,
there is no enforcement or procedures in place, such as the government conducting an internal
audit, to ensure companies follow set guidelines. Where there are no enforcement mechanisms,
problems of companies producing falsified reports can (and do) arise. In 2015, the EPA found
that Volkswagen had been cheating emissions tests making it appear that diesel cars were
emitting far less pollution than they actually were (Clarke, et al., 2015).
Secondly, softer, principles-based forms of law are insufficient on their own for the issues
that automated decision-making systems raise because they are slow to adapt to rapidly changing
circumstances. There is a growing gap between technological advancement in machine learning
(or artificial intelligence more broadly) and, considering partisan gridlock makes it notoriously
difficult to pass legislation, laws that reflect changes in attitudes are slow to change.
Additionally, it could also be argued that the sector-specific, principles-based approach to
internet regulation such as privacy law have largely failed considering that privacy policies are
often long and convoluted and users often do not have a choice in which information they choose
to disclose without abdicating their rights to freely navigate the internet (Brownlie, 2020).
Additionally, computer software is protected by software licensing laws (any software shipped
by a company or programmers prohibits the copying or sharing of that software) and proprietary
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software that was developed in-house introduces issues of accountability that make it hard for
judges to determine who should be responsible when a claim arises.
Still, I must stress that crafting technical standards for automated decision-making and
machine learning has proven exceedingly difficult since the problems of regulating automated
decision-making come from balancing the promotion of market-based innovation with
regulations on the use and application of these systems. Likewise, regulating automated decisionmaking with a one-size-fits-all approach has been particularly challenging considering automated
decision-making operates in different scales, different contexts, and with different abilities
(Scherer, 2016). Perhaps then not surprising, there is inherent difficultly in deriving a shared
conceptual understanding of these systems and, as a result, strategies for regulating automated
decision-making have been piecemeal. For example, the Food and Drug Administration, in
taking a risk-based approach to regulating new software as medical devices, has established its
own approval process that technologies intending to treat, diagnose, cure, mitigate, or prevent
disease must undergo before they are widely distributed (“Proposed Regulatory Framework for
Modifications to Artificial Intelligence/Machine Learning Based Software as a Medical Device,”
2019). However, because the physical threat to safety that software as medical devices pose
makes them easier to regulate, automated decision-making is more complex where bias and
discrimination cannot be easily proven given a black box. While an array of regulatory tools are
available at the government’s discretion, the United States government has approached
regulation over the last several decades using two dominant approaches: rules-based approach
and principles-based approaches. That being said, I believe a hybrid regulatory approach that is
more heavily based prescribing rules with additional emphasis given to outlining principles for
the regulation of ADM technologies would be best given the unique issues of ADM and machine

15

learning techniques. This is because traditional principles-based approaches are insufficient on
their own given the technical shortcomings and newfangled ethical concerns of ADM systems.
Additionally, strict ‘command-and-control’ approaches, as I will soon show, have their own
drawbacks as well.
This paper has proceeded thus far by heavily emphasizing why automated decision-support
systems require government intervention and less on how the government can fulfill its duty of
protecting societal well-being from the harms and abuses of these systems. Based on a thorough
assessment of the peer-reviewed articles, media publications, government reports, books, and
podcasts, missing is a cross-literature bibliometric analysis that identifies the various approaches
the United States government might take in realizing its goals provided a synthesis of available
regulatory tools. Seeing that regulation does not just exist in the abstract, but as a set of
actionable policy goals, the next step should be working toward a regulatory approach.

IV.

Toward a Greater Regulatory Framework

Scholarship and the media alike tend to use the term ‘regulation’ to intuitively refer to
government intervention in liberty and choices through an administrative body adopting legal
rules or promulgations. At this point, it becomes necessary to define what is meant by regulation.
The definitive legal dictionary, Black Law’s Dictionary, defines regulation as ‘the act of
regulating; a rule or order prescribed for management or government; a regulating principle.’
Equally alike, the Oxford English Dictionary defines regulation as ‘the action or fact of
regulating.’ If we assume that the goal of regulation is to intervene where the market fails and
that the overall governmental objective is to protect societal well-being, then, in fulfilling its
obligation, a definition of regulation must include the tools and instruments available to realize
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this goal. Therein, the overarching governmental objective for the purpose of a regulatory
scheme is as follows: ‘Curtailing the threat that profiling places on individuals and groups based
on machine-generated insights including data collected on prior and present behavior, personal
and professional interests, geographic location, and social determinants such as race, gender,
ethnicity, age, and disability.’ Executive Order 12866, which requires federal agencies to engage
in a cost-benefit analysis of proposed regulations, more narrowly defines regulation as ‘an
agency statement of general applicability and future effect, which the agency intends to have an
effect of law, that is designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or to describe
the procedure or practice requirements of an agency.’ It is the definition that this paper relies on.
Despite current challenges, multiple national and international governing agencies have set
forth frameworks for the development of guidelines, principles, and standards for the many uses
of ADM systems given underlying ethical concerns. For example, in 2019, Singapore released its
Model AI Governance Framework which focuses on articulating a set internal governance
structures and measures, human involvement in AI-augmented decision-making, operations
management and stakeholder interaction and communication (“Model Artificial Intelligence
Governance Framework,” 2019). Seeing as the problems of automated decision-making require
both technical competence and principled decision-making, an executive agency whose primary
purpose is to regulate automated decision-making, and artificial intelligence more broadly, is
integral to the development of regulatory schemas. Agencies have a distinct advantage over
legislatures and judges in policymaking for several reasons. For one, agency policymakers tend
to be experts in the relevant field rather than broad generalists like judges or legislators (Scherer,
2016). Two, agencies have the ability to quickly respond to any changes in the technology
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landscape since they are not stymied by the political process. And, third, administrative agencies
can act ex ante whereas judges enact laws ex post (Scherer, 2016).

i.

Risk-based assessment and cost-benefit analysis (CBA)

To determine the benefits and drawbacks of the potential risks of automated decision-making
and machine learning techniques, a risk-based assessment is necessary. Risk-based assessments
are well-established in areas of public health and safety, toxicology, environmental regulation,
defense, and novel technologies (Scott, et al., 1999). Mathematical techniques analyze the
probabilities and potentially harmful effects of an activity making this approach increasingly
attractive. Empirically driven by scientific research, risk-based approaches provide decisionmakers with probabilities, hazards, and assessments over a particular area concerning society, the
environment, economy, government, or industry. These are subjective issues that require the
insight of technical experts such as statisticians, data scientists in addition to social scientists,
legal scholars, and others. An administrative agency composed of technical expertise would
typically develop a risk matrix.
Executive Order 12866, passed by the Clinton Administration, requires that a cost-benefit
analysis be prepared for any ‘significant’ proposed regulation by executive agencies (Sunstein,
2015). These includes costs and benefits to industry, government, individuals, communities, the
environment, and the economy. Following a risk-based assessment, I believe a cost-benefit
analysis that could include determining the net benefits, harms, and benefits of a specific policy
proposal is the successive step in a regulatory proposal. For example, the cost of training tools
and materials for the use of automated decision-making systems could be determined using a
cost-benefit analysis. Still, many factors could go into a cost-benefit analysis making it hard to
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determine the relevant information. For example, how could the social costs of altogether
banning artificial intelligence be monetized? Given that the problems of regulation stem from a
diffuse technology, regulating automation as a decision-support system must be done through a
multi-sector approach in higher education, employment screening, financial services, and
healthcare. Therefore, shared consensus amongst technical experts is required further lending
credibility to the idea of an executive agency.

i.

Rules-based approach

Traditional ‘command-and-control,’ rules-based approaches are highly prescriptive. They
include explicit rules on what can and cannot be done. For example, a ‘right to an explanation’
forms the basis of the EU’s General Data Privacy Rights (GDPR) principles on privacy rights
and data usage. A compelling solution to make automated systems more transparent,
explainability requires that a logical explanation is provided where the intentions behind the
modeling process, summary statistics and descriptions of the input data used to train the model,
information on the model’s predictive skill, how inputs are turned into outputs, and how the
model was tested, trained, or screened for undesirable properties are made available by request
(Edwards and Veale, 2017). Explainability stems from concerns over autonomy in greater
individual discretion over what type of information is disclosed to private companies.
Approaches such as these require that the regulator take responsibility to develop and enforce
rules. Say the government wants to focus on preventing unfair outcomes then it could develop a
process for showing that a product, service, or system meets the requirements of a technical
standard. Such rules that regulators might formulate might require that machine learning
algorithms are trained on a specific number of datasets before being approved for use.
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However, as argued in Slave to the Algorithm? Why A ‘Right to an Explanation’ Is Probably
Not the Remedy You Are Looking For, explainability only goes so far (Edwards and Veale,
2017). For one, meaningful explanations do not work well for every task, and, secondly,
explanations fall short where outliers in the dataset cannot be easily interpreted. Looking at the
broader intent behind explainability, even by requiring explainability under privacy law, it is not
enough for dealing with the larger issues related to the discussion above for two reasons. One,
even without information on personal characteristics such as race, or class, machine learning
algorithms (as discussed above) draw statistical inferences based on data inputs. Additionally,
transparency in the form of explainability only goes so far as the subject is aware that a machine
learning algorithm was used to assist in making a decision. Machine learning is used in many
contexts that is largely unknown to the user such as in application screenings where the user does
not have the option to contest the decision. Therefore, a rules-based approach to regulation might
need to be complemented by a principles-based approach that requires employers to disclose if
they have used an algorithm for hiring decisions based on avoiding an outcome. Still, applying
one approach over another should be based on a critical assessment of the specific context of
regulation. Further research might include an empirical study assessing public opinion on the
perceived risks and harms these technologies pose.

Figure 1.1: Cost-benefit analysis of differing regulatory strategies in the context of automated
decision-making and machine learning

Rules-based approach

Costs

Benefits

Best where there are high risks

High compliance costs

Highly prescriptive

Limits scope of innovation
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Principles-based approach

Limited flexibility

Highly prescriptive

Subjective judgements
required to assess what actions
are likely to achieve the
objective

Ensures regulator is ultimately
accountability

Regulatees can overcomply or
undercomply

More adaptive to fast-moving
sectors and market changes

Would turn to goals-based
approach where risks are
heterogeneous such as where
risks are diffuse

Encourages experimentation
and alternative approaches to
compliance

Requires ex ante determination
of what conduct is permissible

Ensures regulatees are
accountable
Hybrid-approach

Can ‘soften the edges’
associated with each approach

Regulatory strategy could
compound the negative
attributes of each approach–
Combines positive attributes of with neither approaches being
each approach
efficient nor optimal
Allows regulates flexibility
and innovation in compliance

May not fully reap benefits of
each approach

Allows regulates to better
appreciate and understand the
general regulatory goals that
are being pursued in a specific
area
Decker, Christopher, (2018). Goals-based and Rules-based Approaches to Regulation. BEIS Research Paper Number 8,
Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3717739

V.

Conclusion

Automated decision-making raises specific concerns where the internet does not since the
way data is generated, collected, and used has profound implications for what information is
valued and what is knowable. With various social actors with competing interests shaping the
way data is used and on what terms, private companies are capable of guiding societal behavior
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as new patterns in individual behavior, but also institutions, governments, and other entities,
emerge. The primary function of this paper is to help researchers operationalize concepts in the
literature so far as they are qualitatively focused. I begin with a broad overview of the technical
difficulties associated with automated decision-making and machine learning algorithms as they
have the potential to exacerbate inequalities in unprecedented ways. Given that widespread
concern over these specific issues has been the central focus of the discussion, I argue that
researchers have successfully translated these issues into overarching normative concerns
arguing that there is a need for some form of regulation that could guide policy objectives set
forth by an executive agency. The governmental objective that I propose, given the ethical
concerns of these systems, is as follows: ‘Curtailing the threat that profiling places on individuals
and groups based on machine-generated insights including data collected on prior and present
behavior, personal and professional interests, geographic location, and social determinants such
as race, gender, ethnicity, age, and disability.’ I then proceed by arguing that gaps in the
literature exist in identifying specific mechanisms and tools to use in realizing these greater
policy objectives. The successive step in strengthening regulatory schemas around automated
decision-making comes in deciding how to regulate. A conceptual framework could help
industry leaders, researchers and scientists, policymakers, committed to ensuring the protection
of human rights and civil liberties, take actionable steps to prevent harms and abuses by these
novel systems.
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